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GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN HOLIDAY
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS: IMPROVING ON LYNCH AND
ALLEGHENY
Bruce M. Zessar*
INTRODUCTION
The Christmas holiday season is a familiar time to most Americans. Many
people adorn their houses, inside and out, with symbols of the season. Christ-
mas trees, wreaths, lights, Santa Clauses, reindeer, and creches (Nativity
scenes) are some of the typical decorations. Business establishments get into
the act as well. So do governmental entities.
Until recently, relatively little turmoil brewed over government involvement
in holiday religious displays. Whether it was a city's own ornaments that the
city put up or privately owned decorations that the town permitted on public
property, not much attention was paid to the legal ramifications of such holi-
day displays. However, over the last decade, a flurry of cases has confronted
courts with the troublesome and difficult issue of whether government partici-
pation in holiday displays violates the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.'
The United States Supreme Court has issued opinions twice on this thorny
issue, six years ago in Lynch v. Donnelly,2 and two years ago in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU.' Neither opinion has provided any clear guidelines to gov-
* The author is a graduate of Stanford Law School (J.D. 1990) and Harvard University (A.B.
1987). Admitted to practice in Illinois, Mr. Zessar is presently associated with the Chicago law
firm of Sidley & Austin.
This article began as a paper for Professor Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law Workshop at
Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Professor Gunther and to Edward Gaffney, Jr. for their
helpful comments and assistance on this Article.
The views expressed in this Article, except as otherwise indicated, are solely those of the author.
1. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause provides, "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Amendment has been applied to state and local governments through the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporation doctrine, which holds that the Bill of Rights applies with equal
force to the states as well as the Federal Government. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) (stating that there is every reason to give the same application and broad
interpretation to the "establishment of religion clause" as has been given by the courts, since the
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state
action).
2. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
3. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The Supreme Court took up a third case but split 4-4 on the outcome
and issued no opinion. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affd sub nom. Board
of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
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ernmental bodies, which commonly partake in holiday displays, or to lower
courts, which hear many holiday-oriented religion cases. The Supreme Court
has been criticized for failing to elucidate a coherent Establishment Clause
analysis in this area.4
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine as
applied to government involvement in holiday displays., Part I explores the
case law from Lynch to Allegheny. Part II probes the problems in existing
legal doctrine, the historical record on government-backed holiday displays,
and the other critical factors to consider in this area. Based on these consider-
ations, Part III proposes a strengthening of the Lemon test, the backbone of
Establishment Clause analysis for almost two decades. This framework calls
for broad-based abstinence of governmental bodies from holiday religious dis-
plays, but at the same time protects private religious expression.
I. COURT CASES FROM LYNCH To ALLEGHENY
The case law from Lynch to Allegheny depicts major judicial conflicts over
the application of the Establishment Clause to government involvement in hol-
iday religious displays. A discussion of this case history sheds light on the key
factors to consider in an Establishment Clause analysis of government-backed
holiday displays.6
4. Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1436, 1438 (1987); see Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 864 F.2d 1291, 1293 (7th Cir.
1989) (calling for the Supreme Court to decide Allegheny "in a way that diminishes the role of
architectural judgment in constitutional law"). Beyond holiday religious displays, the Supreme
Court has been faulted for its overall treatment of religion clause issues. See Steven D. Smith,
Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorse-
ment" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 269 n.9 (1987) (stating that critics who have analyzed the
Religion Clause believe the Court's treatment of Establishment Clause issues is unsatisfactory).
I recognize that the Supreme Court will hear an Establishment Clause case in the Cotober 1991
term, Lee v. Weisman, Ill S. Ct. 1305 (1991), granting cert. to 908 F.2d 1090 (st Cir.), affg
728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), that many observers predict will be used by the Court to eliminate
the Lemon test, see Review of Supreme Court's Docket, 60 U.S.L.W. 3181, 3181 (Sept. 24,
1991), in favor of a less stringent and more "accomodationist" Establishment Clause test. Al-
though this Article focuses on holiday religious displays, the analysis (especially in Part 11) dem-
onstrates that the direction that the Supreme Court is expected to take is ill conceived and, inter
alia, insensitive to the views of religious minorities.
5. The terms "holiday display" and "religious display," as used in this Article, refer to displays
erected during the Christmas season, but the analysis in many places can be applied to religious
displays generally. The term "government-backed holiday display" denotes any display requiring
government sanction, including private displays in public parks as well as displays owned, erected,
and maintained by governmental entities.
This Article focuses on Christmastime religious displays because, as the large amount of litiga-
tion on such exhibits shows, holiday displays have carved out their own niche in Establishment
Clause law, with their own set of special circumstances.
6. One qualm that I have with many articles is that they provide too little objective presenta-
tion of cases before the writers start criticizing the opinions. This makes it difficult for the reader
who is not familiar with the cases to assess the merits of an author's contentions. Thus, I have
included a substantial discussion of the case law from Lynch to Allegheny.
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A. Lynch v. Donnelly
The Lynch case involved a Christmas display in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.7
The city annually erected its own decor in a privately owned park in the heart
of the city's shopping area.8 The display included "secular" symbols such as a
Santa Clause house, a Christmas tree, reindeer, and a "Seasons Greetings"
banner. 9 Also exhibited was a creche-a "religious" symbol that depicts the
Birth of Christ. 0 A creche had been part of the city's display for at least forty
years, the most recent one purchased by the city in 1973 for $1365.1 Donnelly
and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") brought suit in federal
court, alleging that the inclusion of the creche in the display violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.12 The Rhode Island District Court agreed with the
ACLU, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."3
1. The Lynch Majority
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, reversed the lower courts."' Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger opened his legal analysis of the Lynch
case by addressing the general goals of the First Amendment's two religion
clauses:
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is "to prevent, as far as possible,
the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the
other." At the same time, however, the Court has recognized that "total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense."
... [A wall between church and state] is not a wholly accurate descrip-
tion of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between
church and state. 18
Chief Justice Burger argued that the Constitution does not require complete
separation of church and state. 6 On the contrary, "it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility to-
ward any.'7
In support of his argument that Pawtucket's display of its creche did not
violate the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger noted other official ac-
7. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
8. Id. at 671.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between sec-
ular and religious holiday symbols, and whether that distinction is useful for Establishment Clause
purposes).
11. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 671-72.
14. Id. at 688.
15. Id. at 672-73 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 673.
17. Id.
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knowledgments of religion that have been permitted. These acknowledgments
include presidential and congressional announcements proclaiming Christmas
and Thanksgiving as national holidays in religious terms, government-compen-
sated chaplains in Congress and state legislatures, the national motto "In God
We Trust," and the religious decor of Moses and the Ten Commandments in
the Supreme Court's own chamber.18 These official recognitions of religion,
Chief Justice Burger argued, indicate that the Establishment Clause is not a
clear wall between church and state, but a blurred and variable barrier, de-
pending on the particular case.19
Though Chief Justice Burger noted that the Supreme Court has been un-
willing to confine itself to any one Establishment Clause test, he did apply the
Court's three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman2° to the Lynch case.2" Under
the Lemon test, a government action must have a secular purpose, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.22 If a
government action fails any prong of the three-part Lemon test, the action
violates the Establishment Clause.
For the secular purpose portion of the three-part test, Chief Justice Burger
stated that the creche must be viewed in the context of the Christmas season.22
He found that Pawtucket had a secular purpose for including the creche in its
holiday display-to depict the historical origins of Christmas.2 4 Inclusion of
the creche was not a "purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of
subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. '2' To satisfy
the primary effect portion of the test, Chief Justice Burger found that the
effect of including the creche was no more an advancement of religion than
the permitted official acknowledgements discussed above. 28 He also determined
that little government entanglement with religion existed, because church au-
thorities were not involved in exhibiting the display, the cost of the display to
Pawtucket was minimal, and divisiveness along religious lines did not exist
during the forty years that the creche was in Pawtucket's holiday display. 27
18. Id. at 675-77.
19. Id. at 674-79. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan took issue with the majority's use of
history to support Pawtucket's display of its creche. Id. at 720-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 46-47, 120-62 and accompanying text (asserting that government-backed holiday
displays are a relatively recent development, and not deeply-rooted in this country's history).
20. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
22. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
24. Id. at 680.
25. Id.
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-85. The Court held that a litigant cannot, by filing a lawsuit, create
the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement. Id. Political divi-
siveness seems more suited for analysis under the "primary effect" prong of the Lemon test (divi-
siveness being an effect of the government action), but the Court has placed it under the entangle-
ment prong. Id. at 669.
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Having satisfied himself (and four other members of the Court) that Paw-
tucket's display of the city owned creche met the Lemon test, Chief Justice
Burger went on to add:
It would be ironic . ..if the inclusion of a single symbol of a particular
historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in the West-
ern World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people ... would so
"taint" the city's exhibit as to render it violative of the Establishment
Clause.2 8
Thus, the Court found that Pawtucket did not violate the Establishment
Clause by publicly displaying its creche. 9
2. The Lynch Dissent
Chief Justice Burger's Lynch decision, as noted earlier, was a narrow 5-4
victory for Pawtucket. There was a clear ideological schism between the ma-
jority and the dissent over the Establishment Clause's general import. The
Lynch majority did not view the Clause as calling for strict separation between
church and state. As stated above, the Lynch majority believed that the Estab-
lishment Clause is a blurred barrier between church and state, mandating ac-
commodation and not mere tolerance. 30
The four Lynch dissenters disagreed. Justice Brennan, writing for all four
dissenting Justices, argued, "[The Lemon] test is designed to ensure that the
organs of government remain strictly separate and apart from religious affairs
. 31 Justice Brennan saw the Establishment Clause as mandating govern-
ment neutrality with respect to religion, which would mean the government
must avoid not only the official establishment of a state religion, but also
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued that the majority's application of the Lemon test perverted
its meaning. Id. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Several commentators agree. See, e.g., Thomas
R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 270-71 (1986) (stating that the "Court floundered in Lynch [be-
cause] ... [aill the opinion writers attempted to use a test designed for cases with a lower level of
political oppression"); William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's
Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 784-85 (stating that
the Lynch case fits in the literal wording of the Lemon test, and the Lynch decision did not need to
be compromised by the majority's "ineffectual attempt to compare the city's illuminated, commer-
cially manufactured, outdoor nativity scene to the mere inclusion of historic religious paintings in
a public museum"); see also infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text (discussing problems with
the Lemon test).
28. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686.
29. Id. at 687. Justice O'Connor, concurring with Chief Justice Burger's opinion, offered a
"clarification" of the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Jus-
tice O'Connor's test has been called the "no endorsement" test. Her test holds that a government
action passes Establishment Clause muster if it does not foster institutional entanglement with
religion, and if the intent and the effect of the action do not amount to endorsement of a particu-
lar religion or religious belief. Id. at 689-90; see infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing problems with Justice O'Connor's test).
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in reli-
gious activity.1
32
Based in large part on the ideological differences between the majority and
the dissent, the dissent's application of the Lemon test found Pawtucket's
creche unconstitutional." The dissent determined that each prong of the test
was violated. First, there was no secular purpose for including the creche in
Pawtucket's display. Justice Brennan found that the creche, unlike the Santa
Claus, reindeer, and the like, reflected a sectarian exclusivity.3 5 Justice Bren-
nan did not believe that the city had a legitimate secular purpose in depicting
the "religious" historical origins of Christmas. 36 As for other possible secular
purposes, such as celebrating the holiday in general and promoting downtown
retail sales, Justice Brennan argued that these goals could be accomplished
without the creche. He believed the "secular" Christmas symbols in the dis-
play were sufficient.37
Second, Justice Brennan found that the primary effect of the creche's inclu-
sion was to advance Christianity.3 1 "Those who believe[d] in the message of
the nativity scene receive[d] the unique and exclusive benefit of public recog-
nition and approval of their views."3 9 Non-Christians, religious minorities in
this country, were made to feel like outsiders in their community, and the
creche exerted an "indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to con-
form to prevailing officially approved religion."'40
Finally, regarding the potential for excessive government entanglement with
religion, Justice Brennan noted that the Mayor of Pawtucket had said that he
would include a Jewish menorah in future displays. 41 Justice Brennan worried
that this would lead other religious groups to press for inclusion of their sym-
bols, forcing the city to become involved in obliging the many groups.42 In
addition, Justice Brennan disputed Chief Justice Burger's analysis concerning
the political divisiveness issue. The calm that existed before the suit was filed
may have merely indicated that minorities considered it futile to oppose the
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 704.
34. Id. at 698.
35. Id. at 699-700.
36. Id. at 713.
37. Id. at 698-700. Chief Justice Burger argued in the majority opinion that even if the city's
objectives could be achieved without including the creche, the point was irrelevant because "[tlhe
question is whether the display of the creche violates the Establishment Clause." Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 681 n.7. Chief Justice Burger's response merely begs the question of what the elements of the
Establishment Clause test should be. For example, should the availability of less religious alterna-
tives to the creche bear on the legality of it? See infra note 50 (discussing Justice Brennan's
Lynch dissent, where he argues that a government body may not use religious means to reach
secular goals where secular means will suffice).
38. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 701-02.
41. Id. at 702.
42. Id.
[Vol. 41:101
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Christian majority.'8 The powerful, emotional reactions that were unleashed
by the suit, Justice Brennan argued, demonstrated that the creche was an is-
sue that brought about community divisiveness along religious lines." Thus,
Justice Brennan found that Pawtucket's creche posed an entanglement
problem."
Beyond rejecting the majority's Lemon test analysis, the dissent stressed
that the majority's use of history was misplaced. Whereas government-paid
chaplains in legislatures might be justified on the ground that such chaplains
have existed since the framing of the Constitution,' 6 Justice Brennan found
that government-backed creche displays are a relatively modern phenomenon,
not rooted in our past.'
Thus, failing the Lemon test and lacking "widespread, undeviating accept-
ance that extends throughout our history,"' 8 in the dissent's view, the Paw-
tucket creche violated the Establishment Clause.
B. Lower Court Cases Between Lynch and Allegheny
Although Chief Justice Burger's majorityopinion was the "binding prece-
dent" of the Lynch case, the precedent it established was in question. Justice.
Brennan's dissenting opinion took up this important practical point: the Lynch
decision may well have rested on the particular holiday context in which Paw-
tucket's creche appeared.' 9 While a creche amidst a Santa Claus and reindeer
could appear unoffensive to the majority, Justice Brennan argued that the
Court's decision left many unanswered questions. For example, Justice Bren-
nan asked whether it would be constitutional for a city to be involved in the
display of a creche standing alone.50 Other questions also come to mind. Does
43. Id. at 703.
44. Id. at 702-03. At trial, Mayor Lynch testified that he had never seen people as mad as they
were over Pawtucket's creche. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (DR.!. 1981), affid,
691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court judge stated that
the case smelled of the "acrid fumes of religious chauvinism." Id. at 1180.
45. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (stating that legislative chaplains are constitu-
tional because of historical acceptance).
47. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 718-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id. at 705.
50. Id. at 695. Justice Brennan also pointed out that the majority decision left open the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the public display of such clearly religious symbols as a cross. Id.
Lower courts have dealt with the cross issue, and no courts before or since Lynch have found a
government cross display constitutional. ACLU v. Mississippi State Gen. Servs. Admin., 652 F.
Supp. 380, 384 (S.D. Miss. 1987). Many lower court judges, at least in cross cases, have agreed
with Justice Brennan that a government body may not employ religious means to reach secular
goals where secular means will suffice. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 275
(7th Cir.) (holding that ACLU was entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting St. Charles'
display of a lighted cross), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986); ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber
of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1111 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that construction of cross in a state
park violated the Establishment Clause, and alleged secular purpose for promoting tourism would
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Lynch permit a privately owned creche display on public property?51 What
about a creche standing in front of a public building?
The lower federal courts ran into conflict over these questions. A Virginia
district court ruled that a privately owned creche standing alone on the front
lawn of a county office building violated the Establishment Clause, because a
creche on public property in front of a public building generated a strong mes-
sage of government endorsement of Christianity." The Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, found a similar display on a village hall's front lawn constitutional.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit found that a creche standing alone
in the lobby of Chicago's Daley Center (home to the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois) violated the Establishment Clause because the creche com-
municated government endorsement of Christianity.54 However, privately
owned creche and menorah displays placed in Daley Plaza, adjacent to the
Daley Center, were deemed constitutional on the basis that the exhibits were
merely a form of speech permitted by the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech in a public forum like Daley Plaza.55 The Second Circuit
arrived at the same conclusion in a similar case, finding a privately owned
creche displayed in a public park constitutional.5"
not provide a basis for alleviating the conflict with the Establishment Clause); Jewish War Veter-
ans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 14 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that a cross as a memorial to
servicemen missing in action could not withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny); Libin v. Town
of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Conn. 1985) (determining that plaintiffs were entitled to
a preliminary injunction against town for the display of a cross on a firehouse); Greater Houston
Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (stating that erection of
three crosses and Star of David in public-park war memorial violated the Establishment Clause),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
51. The Court took up this issue in Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985), but
split 4-4 on the case and issued no opinion, thus affirming the Second Circuit's decision in the
case. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (discussed
infra note 56 and accompanying text).
52. Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 559-60 (W.D. Va. 1988), affd, 895 F.2d 953 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 74 (1990).
53. Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 864 F.2d 1291, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989). The Mundelein
creche belonged to the city, and it stood virtually alone each Christmas for 25 years. Id. at 1292.
In 1987, the village added a Christmas tree, Santa Claus, and other secular symbols. Id. A dis-
senting judge in Mather saw the case much like the Smith case, discussed supra text accompany-
ing note 52. Id. at 1298-99 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
54. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1987). The
creche in question was donated to the city in the 1950s. Id. at 122.
When the Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the Daley Center from Mundelein's village
hall front lawn in Mather, it stressed that the Daley Center creche was indoors while Mundelein's
creche was "outdoors, just as in Pawtucket." Mather, 864 F.2d at 1293. Judge Flaum recognized
the superficiality of the indoor-outdoor distinction in his Mather dissent. Id. at 1299 (Flaum, J.,
dissenting).
55. Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 700 F. Supp. 1497, 1500-03 (N.D. II1. 1988)
56. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affd sub nom. Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). The same ruling occurred in the case of a privately owned meno-
rah displayed in a public park. See Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Vt. 1988)
(holding that a privately owned menorah display in a public park did not violate the Establish-
[Vol. 41:101
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C. County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Recognizing the questions left unanswered by the Lynch decision and the
conflicting lower court opinions on those issues, the Supreme Court took up
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.57 Allegheny was actually two cases rolled into
one, involving two recurring holiday displays on public property in downtown
Pittsburgh. The first was a privately owned creche displayed on the Grand
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, the "main," "most beautiful,"
and "most public" part of the courthouse.5" There were no secular symbols
like a Santa Claus displayed with the creche.59 Two banners accompanied the
creche, one stating that the creche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a
Roman Catholic Group, and another that said "Gloria in Excelsis Deo,"
meaning "Glory to God in the Highest." 60
The second display was a privately owned eighteen foot Chanukah meno-
rah,61 located just outside the City-County Building next to the city's forty-five
foot decorated Christmas tree.62 A sign at the foot of the tree bore the mayor's
name and included text declaring the city's "salute to liberty."6 Though
owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, the menorah was stored, erected, and re-
moved each year by the City of Pittsburgh."'
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
relying on Lynch, found both the creche and menorah displays constitutional,
but a divided Third Circuit panel reversed, determining that the exhibits en-
dorsed Christianity and Judaism.65
The Supreme Court took up Allegheny to show more clearly the Court's
position on holiday displays, and to provide better guidance to governmental
bodies that are involved in such exhibits. The High Court's opinion, though,
indicates that the Justices disagree more now than ever before.66 The Court
found the creche unconstitutional by a 5-4 margin, with Justice Blackmun
writing a partial majority opinion on the creche display. 7 Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall sided with Justice Blackmun on the creche
display, while Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White dissented.
ment Clause), rev'd, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
57. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
58. Id. at 579.
59. Id. at 580-81.
60. Id. at 580 & n.5.
61. The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol that represents an eight-day Jewish holiday
that starts on the 25th day of the Jewish lunar month of Kislev. Id. at 582. It usually falls in
December, making it the Jewish holiday closest to Christmas every year. Id.
62. Id. at 573.
63. Id. at 582.
64. Id. at 587.
65. Id. at 588-89.
66. Summarizing a decision with several lengthy opinions can be quite difficult. The opinion of
District Judge Graham in ACLU v. County of Delaware, 726 F. Supp. 184 (S.D. Ohio 1989),
proved invaluable in isolating the key points in the various Allegheny opinions.
67. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578-79.
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However, the Court upheld the menorah display 6-3, with no majority opin-
ion.18 Justices Blackmun and O'Connor were joined by the creche dissenters in
upholding the menorah display's legality, while Justices Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall believed that the menorah display was unconstitutional just as the
creche exhibit.6 9
Justice Blackmun's partial majority opinion reaffirmed the use of the Lemon
test and focused on the "primary effect" prong: whether the government ac-
tion's principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion. 0 The creche
majority held that a government action violates the Establishment Clause if it
"has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion. 17 1 If the government shows
preference for one religion or religious belief over another religion or over dis-
belief, it has unconstitutionally endorsed religion, because "[tihe Establish-
ment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a
position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a reli-
gion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.' "72
Although five Justices agreed that the endorsement-primary effect test was
the correct focus, there were several opinions on how to apply the test. Justice
Blackmun, in a part of his opinion joined only by Justice Stevens, concluded
that the display's effect depends on whether viewers fairly understand the dis-
play's purpose to be government endorsement of religion.73
Justice O'Connor interpreted the endorsement test somewhat differently.
She reiterated her belief, stated in Lynch, that each government action must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it endorses or dis-
approves of religion .7  The key issue to probe in scrutinizing a holiday reli-
gious display was whether the exhibit communicates a message of religious
endorsement or a message of cultural pluralism.7 5 In Justice O'Connor's view,
the Allegheny creche, standing alone in front of an important government
building, endorsed religion, while the Chanukah menorah and Christmas tree
display showed the United States' cultural diversity and "convey[ed] tolerance
of different choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing
that the winter holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways by our citizens. 7 6
Justice Brennan, concurring on the creche and dissenting on the menorah,
argued that government display of a symbol that has a clear religious meaning
68. Id. at 579.
69. Id. at 637 (Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lemon test. The Court did
not address the "secular purpose" and "entanglement" prongs of the Lemon test because the court
of appeals had not addressed them, but Justice Blackmun noted that these prongs could be consid-
ered by the lower courts on remand. Allegheny. 492 U.S. at 620-21.
71. Allegheny. 492 U.S. at 592.
72. Id. at 593-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687
(1984)).
73. Id. at 595 (nonmajority portion of opinion of Blackmun, J.).
74. Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 634.
76. Id. at 626-27, 636.
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"is incompatible with the separation of church and state demanded by our
Constitution." 77 Regarding the menorah display, Justice Brennan wondered
how "a 45-foot Christmas tree and an 18-foot Chanukah menorah at the en-
trance to the building housing the Mayor's office shows no favoritism towards
Christianity, Judaism, or both." ' He disagreed with Justice O'Connor that
the menorah display was a benign depiction of cultural pluralism.71 Justice
Brennan found that the menorah, a symbol of religious significance to Jews,
brought out the religious message of the Christmas tree.80
Justice Stevens, concurring on the creche and dissenting on the menorah
like Justice Brennan, did not deal directly with the endorsement test. Rather,
he argued that "the Establishment Clause should be construed to create a
strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public prop-
erty." 8' However, the "strong presumption" would block a display only when
the message is nonsecular.82 Justice Stevens found the creche's message to be
nonsecular. Although he accepted Justice O'Connor's argument that the me-
norah display could convey a message of pluralism and freedom of conscience,
that message was not clear enough "to overcome the strong presumption that
the display, respecting two religions to the exclusion of all others, is the very
kind of double establishment that the First Amendment was designed to
outlaw." 3
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
White, felt that both the creche and the menorah displays were constitutional.
Justice Kennedy accepted the Court's use of the "primary effect" test of
Lemon, but adopted a stance similar to that of the Lynch majority: "Govern-
ment policies of accommodation, acknowledgement, and support for religion
are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage. . . . [T]he Estab-
lishment Clause permits government some latitude in -recognizing and accom-
modating the central role religion plays in our society. 84
Justice Kennedy argued that the case law does disclose two limiting princi-
ples on accommodation: (1) government cannot coerce people to support a reli-
gion; and (2) government may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility to reli-
gion, give benefits to religion so great that it establishes a state religion, or
tends to do so." Applying these principles, Justice Kennedy determined that
both the creche and menorah displays were constitutional, as "the city and
county sought to do no more than 'celebrate the season,'. . . [an interest] well
within the tradition of government accommodation and acknowledgement of
77. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 639-40.
80. Id. at 640-41.
81. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 652.
83. Id. at 655.
84. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 659.
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religion that has marked our history from the beginning."86
D. Lynch and Allegheny Backlash
As Allegheny shows, a diversity of opinion exists on the Supreme Court
concerning the proper application of the Establishment Clause to government
involvement in holiday religious displays. Allegheny, like Lynch, provides no
coherent guidelines for local governments that participate in holiday displays,
nor does it help lower federal courts that hear many creche cases. 87 Justices on
the Supreme Court disagree over the application of the Lemon test, whether
the Establishment Clause calls for "accommodation" or "strict separation,"
what symbols are too "religious" for governments to display, and how history
factors into the holiday display analysis. Part II explores these areas of con-
flict, which are key to a successful application of the Establishment Clause to
government-involved holiday displays.
II. INPUTS TO A SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
One useful way to analyze a constitutional issue is to break it down into
three levels of discussion: (1) doctrinal; (2) historical; and (3) responsive."
Doctrinal analysis focuses on past Court decisions that are precedent for the
issue at hand." Historical inquiry looks at the original intent of the Constitu-
tion's framers, and the historical record on the particular practice at issue. 0
Responsive (or modern) interpretation brings in considerations of today, recog-
nizing that this country is constantly changing and involved in an ongoing
process of national self-definition.91 The factors that come to light under these
three levels of constitutional analysis are explored in this section.
A. Analysis of Establishment Clause Doctrine in Holiday Display Cases
The Lemon test has been the foundation of the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause decisions for nearly two decades. It is also a major reason why
the Court is so confused in applying the Establishment Clause to holiday dis-
plays. That test, as discussed earlier, holds a government action in violation of
the Establishment Clause if it does not succeed on three prongs: (1) the gov-
ernment action must have a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect
86. Id. at 663 (citations omitted).
87. At least one lower court judge, Judge Graham, has recognized the imprecision of Alle-
gheny. ACLU v. County of Delaware, 726 F. Supp. 184, 185 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (stating that
Allegheny did not provide a clear answer to this case, and holding that a Nativity scene on a
courthouse lawn violated the Establishment Clause).
88. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS No. 30 13, 19
(Spring 1990).
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 21. Post would put the historical record under responsive interpretation and confine
historical interpretation to original intent. Id. at 24. 1 alter the analysis out of personal preference
for treating original intent as just one aspect of the historical record.
91. Id. at 23-24.
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must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not
foster an excessive entanglement with religion."'
As applied by the Court, the Lemon test has produced chaotic and conflict-
ing decisions." The Lynch majority opinion seems to repudiate the Lemon
test, because the majority's application of the test to the Pawtucket creche
runs contrary to basic common sense.9" Chief Justice Burger found that the
Pawtucket display had a secular purpose, depicting the historical origins of
Christmas." As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, however, the Birth of
Christ is of religious significance because it is important to Christians but not
to non-Christians." The evidence adduced at trial clearly indicated that the
creche was a distinctive religious symbol. 7 Many people, including the Mayor
of Pawtucket, wanted to keep the creche in the Pawtucket display to "keep
'Christ' in Christmas"-a clearly nonsecular purpose.9"
Moreover, the Lynch majority opinion flies in the face of another religious
symbol case decided just four years earlier, Stone v. Graham." In Stone, the
Court struck down a Kentucky statute authorizing the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms.100 Kentucky argued that there
was a secular purpose in posting the Ten Commandments: to display the fun-
damental legal code of Western civilization. 10 1 The Court did not accept this
alleged secular purpose, noting that the Ten Commandments are clearly a sa-
cred text to Christians and Jews.10
If posting a religious text has no secular purpose, how can a secular purpose
be found in the display of a creche? The Lynch decision is not consistent with
Stone on the secular purpose prong of the three-part Lemon test.'03 As for the
primary effect portion of the test, the Lynch majority found that the Paw-
tucket creche did not advance Christianity, but the empirical evidence showed
otherwise.10 The plaintiffs in Lynch perceived the creche as city support for
Christianity, and the majority's conclusion to the contrary " 'came as a sur-
prise to most Jews,' "'05 as well as four members of the Court.
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
93. See Smith, supra note 4, at 269.
94. See Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 906 (1987) (arguing that Lynch seems to repudiate
the Lemon test).
95. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
96. Id. at 699-700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 695.
98. Id. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id.
103. See Harry Simon, Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public Sponsor-
ship of Religious Displays under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS LI.
499, 509 (1986) (calling Lynch a "radical departure" from decisions like Stone).
104. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 669.
105. Smith, supra note 4, at 301 & n.132 (quoting Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Reli-
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The conflict between the Court's opinions in Stone and Lynch, and the dis-
pute within the Court over Lynch itself, demonstrate that the Lemon test, as
applied to holiday display cases, is an ineffective mode of analysis. 106 To solve
this problem, Justice O'Connor reframed the Lemon test in her Lynch concur-
rence. Justice O'Connor's test has become known as the "no endorsement"
test. 107 The test consists of two prongs. One prong focuses on the purpose and
effect of a government action: what the government intended to communicate
and what message was actually conveyed. 08 In determining what message the
audience received, the focus is on the "objective" meaning of the government
action, as seen by the "reasonable observer."' 0 9
The majority opinion on the Allegheny creche display utilized Justice
O'Connor's "no endorsement" test to interpret the "primary effect" prong of
the Lemon test."0 A majority of the Court found that the creche, standing
alone, endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause."' On
the other hand, the Court found that the Chanukah menorah/Christmas tree
display did not have the effect of endorsing the involved religious faiths." 2
Finding herself in the majority on both Allegheny displays, Justice
O'Connor proclaimed her test a success. "I ...remain convinced that the
endorsement test is capable of consistent application. 11 3 Unfortunately,
O'Connor's perception of her test is not accurate. A significant problem exists
in the effect prong. Who is this "reasonable" observer, from whose perspective
the effect of the government-backed holiday display is judged, and what does
that person see? If the observer is a member of the religion whose symbol is
being displayed-for example, a Christian looking at a creche-the observer
may view the display as innocuous. On the other hand, if the display is viewed
from the standpoint of a nonadherent, the symbols may be seen as an advance-
ment of the displayed religion." 4 As Justice Brennan wondered in Allegheny:
"I do not know how we can decide whether it was the [Christmas] tree that
gion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701. 712 n. 52 (1986)); see supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Lynch).
106. See Harriet Grant, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: The Disappearing Wall, 63 N.C. L. REV.
782, 793 (1985).
107. See supra note 29.
108. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The other prong of Justice O'Connor's
test is whether the government action fosters excessive entanglement with religious institutions. Id.
at 689.
109. Id. at 690; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Smith, supra note 4, at 272.
110. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94.
111. Id. at 612-13.
112. Id. at 620-21 (nonmajority portion of opinion of Blackmun, J.).
113. Id. at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648
(1987) (arguing that application of the Establishment Clause should turn on the message received
by the nonadherent).
[Vol. 41:101
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
stripped the religious connotations from the menorah, or the menorah that laid
bare the religious origins of the tree. Both are reasonable inter-
pretations .... 115
Clearly, the "no endorsement" test is just as indeterminate as the Lemon
test.1" Both tests can be manipulated to fit the particular views of the particu-
lar judge, and they leave open the key questions that must be answered in an
Establishment Clause analysis of holiday displays. The tests do not resolve the
ideological clash between accommodation and strict separation. The tests do
not tell us how history should factor into the analysis. Moreover, they do not
provide us with a definition of religion, a concept critical for intelligent appli-
cation of the Establishment Clause.'17
The search for a single, unifying theory for all Establishment Clause cases
may be, as one writer put it, "chimerical." ' 8 However, it is possible to im-
prove on the Supreme Court's doctrinal analysis of holiday displays in Lynch
and Allegheny. By focusing on the specific Establishment Clause concerns
called forth by government-backed holiday displays, guidelines can be framed
that should lead to greater coherence in analyses of such displays.
B. Historical Considerations in Holiday Display Cases
To facilitate an examination of the historical record, the analysis is broken
into two sections here: (1) holiday displays specifically; and (2) the Establish-
ment Clause in general.
1. What History Teaches Us About Holiday Displays
If we listen to Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia
and White, the historical import of the Establishment Clause dictates "accom-
modations" of Christianity by government."' In his Allegheny opinion, Justice
Kennedy perused Thanksgiving proclamations by Presidents from George
Washington to Franklin D. Roosevelt and pointed out that these Presidents
saw the national day as a day of celebration and prayer. 2 ' Using these exam-
115. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Bren-
nan would strike down the menorah display because religious endorsement was a reasonable inter-
pretation of the display. Id. at 642-43. Blackmun felt otherwise. Id. at 620-21 (nonmajority por-
tion of opinion of Blackmun, J.). Kennedy found it irrelevant. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that past accommodations of Christianity have made
nonadherents feel excluded, although the accommodations have been accepted historically).
116. See Smith, supra note 4, at 301.
117. See Janet L. Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National "'Religion,"
39 MERCER L. REV. 495, 496 (1988).
118. Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1192 (1988).
119. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (stating that "[g]overnment policies of accommodation, ac-
knowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural
heritage").
120. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy also
wrote, "[Franklin D. Roosevelt] went so far as to 'suggest a nationwide reading of the Holy Scrip-
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pies to justify government-backed creche displays, Justice Kennedy concluded,
"It requires little imagination to conclude that these proclamations would
cause nonadherents to feel excluded, yet they have been a part of our national
heritage from the beginning."121
In the eyes of several members of the Court, historical practices have great
force in determining the constitutionality of government-backed holiday dis-
plays.122 "[T]he meaning of the Clause is to be determined by reference to
historical practices and understandings."' 23 Former Chief Justice Burger's
Lynch opinion, which relied heavily on "official acknowledgements"' 24 that
historically have been permitted, arrived at the same result. 25
What do these other historical practices tell us about creche displays? As
Justice Brennan argued in his Lynch dissent, historical acknowledgements of
Christianity, such as Thanksgiving proclamations and state-paid legislature
chaplains, do not tell us anything about the constitutionality of government-
backed holiday displays: 26 "The intent of the Framers with respect to the
public display of nativity scenes is virtually impossible to discern primarily
because the widespread celebration of Christmas did not emerge in its present
form until well into the 19th century.1"127
With respect to the 1800s, Christmas did not become a public holiday in
many states until the middle of the century, and it was not until 1885 that
Congress made it a paid holiday for its employees. 28 The road to making
Christmas a public holiday was bumpy. Much divisiveness existed between
Christian sects over the public celebration of Christmas, as some sects saw it
as a sacrilegious creation of the Church of England or the Roman Catholic
Church.2 9 As late as 1874, a Congregationalist named Henry Ward Beecher
could write: "To me Christmas is a foreign day, and I shall die so. . . . I
understood it was a Romish institution, kept up by the Romish Church."'30
tures during the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas' so that 'we may bear more earnest
witness to our gratitude to Almighty God.' " Id. at 671 (quoting Presidential Proclamation No.
2629, 58 Stat. 1160 (Nov. 1, 1944)).
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (noting that historical practices are impor-
tant to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and White).
123. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-79 (1984).
125. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
126. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 718 (Brennan, J., dissenting). With respect to the chaplains, Marsh v.
Chambers holds that state-paid chaplains for legislatures are constitutional because they have
been permitted since the time that the Bill of Rights was framed. 463 U.S. 783, 787-90 (1983).
The practice, however, was criticized from the early days of the Republic. James Madison saw
congressional chaplains as a mistake, inconsistent with the First Amendment. Van Alstyne, supra
note 27, at 776.
127. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 720 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 723 & n.31.
129. Id. at 722-23 (referring to Puritans, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists who viewed
the celebration of Christmas as sacrilegious).
130. Id. at 722 n.27 (citing ROBERT J. MYERS, CELEBRATIONS: THE COMPLETE BOOK OF AMER-
ICAN HOLIDAYS 314, 316 (1972)).
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As for creche displays specifically, Justice Brennan stated that the historical
evidence suggests creches were introduced by German immigrants who settled
in Pennsylvania in the 1700s, the practice increased with the influx of Roman
Catholics in the 1800s, and it gained wider acceptance in the late 1800s.131
Justice Brennan concluded, "it is simply impossible to tell . . . whether the
practice ever gained widespread acceptance, much less official endorsement,
until the 20th century.
13 2
The facts of Lynch and Allegheny lend strong support to Justice Brennan's
conclusion. Pawtucket only could trace its creche display back to the 1930s or
1940s,' 33 and Allegheny County's creche dated from the early 1980s. 3 ' Thus,
Justice Brennan stood on firm ground when he asserted:
In sum, there is no evidence whatsoever that the framers would have ex-
pressly approved a Federal celebration of the Christmas holiday including
public displays of a nativity scene . . . . Nor is there any suggestion that
publicly financed and supported displays of Christmas creches are supported
by a record of widespread, undeviating acceptance that extends throughout
our history. 13
2. What History Teaches Us About the Establishment Clause In General
There is no historical support for government-backed holiday displays spe-
cifically. That fact, however, did not dissuade Chief Justice Burger in Lynch
or Justice Kennedy in Allegheny from attempting to link creche displays with
other official acknowledgments on a more general level.' 36 Both justices argued
that the historical record mandates "accommodation" of religion in the public
sphere."3 7
However, just as history does not support government-involved holiday dis-
plays specifically, it does not demonstrate a clear message of accommodation.
When the Bill of Rights was being framed, there was a deep division between
states over church-state relations. Seven states had adopted a separationist
philosophy, while six permitted not just accommodation, but also established
131. Id. at 724.
132. Id.; see also Grant, supra note 106, at 790 (quoting Justice Brennan's Lynch dissent).
133. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
134. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989). The Chanukah menorah was
first displayed in the early 1980s, and the Christmas Tree, displayed with the menorah, had been
displayed "[flor a number of years." Id. at 581. Other cases indicate that government-backed
creche displays are a relatively new phenomenon. See, e.g., Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 864
F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1989) (creche displayed on village hall front lawn for 25 years); American
Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987) (creche donated to city in
1950s).
135. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 724-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. See supra notes 18-19, 84-86 and accompanying text.
137. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677-78.
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religions and the use of public power to support and further religion.188 James
Madison attempted to put into the Bill of Rights a general guarantee of reli-
gious liberty, a safeguard adopted in Madison's home state of Virginia. 89
However, Madison's proposal, which would have forced the states to respect
broad religious rights, failed. "1 0
The Framers did agree on one thing: Congress was to stay out of religious
affairs."' Thus, we have a First Amendment that reads, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ."I'2 The only unifying theme that the Framers saw in the religion
clauses was a policy of federalism, which allowed states, but not the national
government, to deal with religious matters.14 3
As for the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s, they proba-
bly did not intend to make the Establishment Clause applicable to the states.
There is persuasive evidence that, even though some congressmen may have
thought that the later amendment incorporated portions of the Bill of Rights,
the Establishment Clause was not incorporated. Nobody in Congress made
mention of the Establishment Clause when the Fourteenth Amendment was
debated, and in 1875 and 1876, Congress rejected a constitutional amendment
providing, "No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 4 One might argue that Con-
gress saw the proposed amendment as superfluous given the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the legislative history shows that supporters and opponents of
the amendment saw it as novel.' 5 Religion was still considered a state issue in
this era, and divisions existed among the states over the degree of separation
138. Conkle, supra note 118, at 1132-33 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE 25-62 (1986)). A fourteenth state, Vermont, admitted to the Union after Congress passed
the First Amendment, but before the states ratified it, also maintained a system of established
religion. Id. at 1133 n.98. Therefore, at the time of ratification, one-half of the states in existence
endorsed such policies: Vermont, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, and South Carolina. Id. at 1132 n.97. The half that did not were Virginia, Delaware, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Id. at 1132 & n.96.
139. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, at 268-73
(1st ed. 1950), cited in Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 773 n.8.
140. Id. at 273. As for Thomas Jefferson, Van Alstyne points out that Jefferson would not issue
presidential Thanksgiving proclamations, finding them contrary to the Establishment Clause. Van
Alstyne, supra note 27, at 775. This fact undermines the argument by Justice Kennedy that such
proclamations have been accepted historically. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
141. Conkle, supra note 118, at 1133; Mark D. Howe, Religion and Race in Public Education,
8 BUFF. L. REv. 242, 245 (1958-59).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
143. Conkle, supra note 118, at 1135. Conkle takes issue with Van Alstyne's argument that the
First Amendment also embodied policies of voluntarism and separatism. Id. Some framers may
have had those goals, but since the states maintaining established religions did not support them,
they cannot be seen as general underlying goals of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1135
n.109 (taking issue with Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 772-78).
144. Conkle, supra note 118, at 1136-39 (quoting 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875)).
145. See id. at 1138 (quoting 4 CONG. REC. 5561 (1876) (statement of Senator
Frelinghuysen)).
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that should be afforded between church and state. 14 6
The historical record, therefore, does not provide uncontroverted support for
a general policy of government "accommodation" of religion, which would
permit government-backed holiday displays. At the same time, history does
not demonstrate a preference for "strict separation." To the extent that history
does support Justice Kennedy's view, however, it is questionable whether that
history is a desirable one upon which to rely, for it is a history wrought with
religious discrimination.
When the First Amendment was framed, the United States was overwhelm-
ingly Protestant and hostile to other faiths. As Professor Douglas Laycock
found, tolerance of non-Protestant faiths was a major accomplishment; accept-
ance of other faiths as equals lay far in the future. 147 John Jay, the country's
first Supreme Court Justice, attempted to have Catholics banished from New
York, and John Adams was quite pleased "that Catholics and Jacobites were
as rare as comets and earthquakes in his hometown of Braintree[, Massachu-
setts].""48 Non-Protestants could practice their religions, but in many places
they could not vote, hold office, or publicly criticize Protestantism.14 9
Discrimination in favor of certain Christian sects lasted well into the 1800s.
Established religion was not abandoned by all .states until 1833.150 Even in the
mid-1800s, mob violence, church burnings, and deaths occurred when
Catholics objected to the use of the Protestant Bible in public schools.' 5 ' And
the anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic Know Nothing Party emerged victorious
in eight states' elections. 52
Religious protections that did exist were limited. The early history of the
Republic indicates that although some, such as James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson, believed in broad religious freedom and a broad separation between
church and state, most people believed that only the Christian diversity de-
served the utmost religious respect. 5' Discrimination against non-Christians
146. Howe, supra note 141, at 246-47.
147. Douglas Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 918 (1986).
148. JAMES HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY-OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC COMMU-
NITY IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (1981) (quoting JOHN ADAMS, WORKS 355 (C. Adams ed.,
1856)).
149. Laycock, supra note 147, at 918.
150. Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 773 n.8 (citing LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREE-
DOM 126 (rev. ed. 1967)).
151. Laycock, supra note 147, at 918. Today, reading of the Bible in public schools is unconsti-
tutional, unless the Bible is presented objectively as part of a secular program of education-for
example, in a comparative religion course. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
225 (1963).
152. Laycock, supra note 147, at 918.
153. For example, Joseph Story wrote: "The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was not to
countenance, much less to advance, Mahometism or Judaism, or infidelity; but to exclude all ri-
valry among Christian sects .... 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1877, at 631-32 (5th ed. 1891); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (stating that perhaps in the early days the Bill of Rights was only
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was permissible. Justice Blackmun, in that part of his Allegheny opinion sup-
ported by a majority of the Supreme Court, cited an incident in 1844 when
the Governor of South Carolina issued a Thanksgiving proclamation.15 The
Governor called on the people of South Carolina "to assemble at their respec-
tive places of worship, to offer up their devotions to God their Creator, and his
Son Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the World. 1 5 The Jews of Charleston
took issue with the Governor, charging him with "such obvious discrimination
and preference . .. as amounted to an utter exclusion of a portion of the
people of South Carolina."115 6 The Governor responded:
I have always thought it a settled matter that I lived in a Christian land!
And that I was the temporary chief magistrate of a Christian people. That
in such a country and among such a people I should be, publicly, called to
an account, reprimanded and required to make amends for acknowledging
Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of the world, I would not have believed it
possible, if it had not come to pass. 57
Justice Kennedy and his allies could use examples like this, instances of
clear official discrimination against religious minorities, to support the idea
that the Establishment Clause mandates accommodation of Christianity and
government-backed Christmas displays. Such a use of history, however, a his-
tory replete with discrimination against religious minorities, is no more persua-
sive today than the use of history by the Plessy v. Ferguson Court that found
Jim Crow laws to be legal: "In determining the question of reasonableness, [a
state government] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
"158customs and traditions of the people ....
In Brown v. Board of Education,'59 Chief Justice Warren recognized that ahistory of racial discrimination could not be used to justify the doctrine of
intended to protect Christian diversity); REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, (E. & E. Hosford eds., 1821) (document provided for Professor Lawrence
Friedman's class titled "History of American Law," Stanford Law School, Spring Semester 1990.
The convention debated the issues of established religion and blasphemy. As the speeches indi-
cate, on the issue of blasphemy the delegates were only concerned with disrespect of sacred as-
pects of Christianity. One delegate remarked that "the religious professions of the Pagan, the
Mahomedan, and the Christian, are not, in the eye of the law, of equal truth and excellence." Id.
(comment of Mr. King in debate on religion, Oct. 30, 1821).
154. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 604 n.53. (1989).
155. MORTON BORDEN, JEws, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 142 n.2 (1984) (quoting THE OCCIDENT
(Jan. 1845)). As Justice Blackmun noted, the story is especially apt in light of Justice Kennedy's
use of Thanksgiving proclamations to support creche displays. See supra notes 119-21.
156. BORDEN, supra note 155, at 142 n.2 (1984) (quoting THE OCCIDENT (Jan. 1845)) (em-
phasis added by Borden).
157. Id. (quoting THE OCCIDENT (Jan. 1845)).
158. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896); see Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 610-11 (1985) (stating
that "one cannot avoid hearing in Lynch a faint echo of the Court that found nothing invidious in
the Jim Crow policy of 'separate but equal' ").
159. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"separate but equal." On the issue of racially separate schools, the Chief Jus-
tice wrote for a unanimous Court:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when
the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Na-
tion. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.' 60
In the context of religion, even Chief Justice Burger recognized that "histor-
ical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-
tees." '' Moreover, as Justice Blackmun recognized, in the part of his Alle-
gheny opinion supported by a majority of the Court, that this country has
changed dramatically in its cultural composition. The United States may have
been almost entirely Christian in the 1700s and 1800s, but "[slince then, ad-
herents of religions too numerous to name have made the United States their
home, as have those whose beliefs expressly exclude religion."'1 62
Overall, history teaches us four lessons about the Establishment Clause and
government-backed holiday displays. First, government-backed holiday dis-
plays are a relatively modern phenomenon. Second, history does not provide
clear evidence of a trend favoring either accommodation or strict separation.
Third, many of the historical "accommodations" of Christianity that the con-
servative members of the Court see are practices that occurred against a back-
ground of officially established religion in some states and discrimination
against religious minorities in general. To rely on those historical accommoda-
tions to justify creche displays is equivalent to relying on past racial discrimi-
nation to justify the doctrine of "separate but equal." Fourth, this country has
changed and is now more culturally diverse today than in the past. Thus, like
the Warren Court's evaluation of segregation in public schools, an analysis of
government-involved holiday displays must focus on our situation today, not on
an ideologically uncertain and intolerant past.
C. A Modern Interpretation of the Establishment Clause For Holiday
Display Cases
Several considerations must be addressed in analyzing holiday displays in a
modern context, based on the needs and circumstances of the contemporary
United States. These issues include the doctrine of "incorporation," a critical
factor in applying the First Amendment to state as well as federal actions.
Also included are the many factors that guide us in determining the extent to
which we draw the line between church and state-factors that include such
important considerations as the view of religious minorities and freedom of
160. Id. at 492-93.
161. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
162. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589 (1989).
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speech. These issues are the subject of this section.
1. Incorporation
The first problem to resolve in a modern analysis involves the application of
the First Amendment to the states. As discussed above, the Fourteenth
Amendment was not adopted with the explicit intent to incorporate the First
Amendment.16 Everson v. Board of Education,64 the first Supreme Court
case to elaborate on the meaning of the Establishment Clause, inaccurately
interpreted the historical record to find that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended that Amendment to incorporate the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's use of history has been in error ever since.165
However, the Supreme Court is not limited to original intent and "histori-
cal" understandings in applying the Constitution. If it were, we might still
have "separate but equal" as a legitimate tool of political policy.'66 Instead, it
has been recognized that the Constitution is a broad and flexible document,
and that the Court has the power to interpret the Constitution for the right
answers to political/moral problems-answers founded on reasoned arguments
of principle and policy. 1'7
Thus, disposing of Plessy and focusing on current evidence, the Warren
Court could find that separate is not equal, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 168 Likewise, the Court can deter-
mine that the First Amendment's restraint on Congress in the area of religion
can be applied to the states through the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's demand that
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of... liberty ... without due process
163. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
164. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
165. Conkle, supra note 118, at 1145. Of course, people such as James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson did favor strict separation of church and state, but as discussed earlier, the framers of
the Bill of Rights and the later framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were divided on the issue.
See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
166. See Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; or, Would You Sign the
Constitution?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 113, 125-35 (1987) (asking which Constitution is ours:
one that legitimizes slavery, or the doctrine of "separate but equal?"); William C. Porth & Rob-
ert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Reexamination of the Establishment Clause, 90
W. VA. L. REV. 109, 120-21 (1987) (stating that original intent is not a satisfactory basis for
constitutional interpretation).
167. Conkle, supra note 118, at 1162; see also Levinson, supra note 166, at 142 (noting that
the Constitution has generated a form of "political rhetoric that allows one to grapple with every
important political issue imagineable").
168. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend
XIV). The Court noted studies showing that blacks felt inferior due to the segregation in public
schools. Id. at 494. Separation of blacks from whites limited a black's ability to study, engage in
discussions with other students, and the like-critical factors, on the psychological level, which led
blacks to feel inferior. Id.
[Vol. 41:101
1991] RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS 123
of law."'6 9 Where a state government aids a religion or prefers some religions
over others it violates these mandates, because in such cases not all persons are
being treated equally, and religious liberties may be unfairly infringed upon.'
2. Accommodation Versus Strict Separation
Given incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate to the states, do we enforce the separation between
church and state strongly, or do we give government "accommodation" in han-
dling religion, as the conservative members of the Court have interpreted the
Establishment Clause?
Literally, complete church-state separation would not make sense. For ex-
ample, it would be absurd to deny police and fire protection to religious insti-
tutions. There is a clear secular purpose in public safety, and to require reli-
gious organizations to have their own private police and fire departments
would be unduly harsh and would jeopardize many financially.' 7'
On the other hand, a general consensus exists that certain church-state rela-
tions should not take place. For example, governments cannot officially estab-
lish churches, nor can taxes be collected to support religious activities.' As
discussed earlier, such separations, taken for granted today, were the source of
controversy in this country's early years.'
7 3
Why has this country moved toward stricter separation of church and state?
For one, the United States is much more culturally diverse today than in the
past '7 4 In addition, today we recognize the value of that cultural diversity.
For example, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 7 the Su-
preme Court recognized that students of varying backgrounds each add some-
169. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
170. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982) (holding Minnesota statute, which imposed registration and extensive reporting
requirements only upon religious groups that solicit over half of their funds from nonmembers,
was unconstitutional because it treated religious groups unequally, favoring well-established
churches over new ones); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 987-89 (1989) (arguing government preference for
a religion increases atmospheric burdens on religious minorities' free exercise of their religions).
As for local governments, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to them as well since they are
creations of the states. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to state action of every kind).
171. See Smith, supra note 4, at 303. An argument could be made that religious institutions
should pay for such protections, but it seems fair to exempt religious groups from taxation, a
burden placed on profit-making activities, and thereby help to prevent religious organizations from
falling into financial trouble and potential reliance on the state. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
172. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at
15-16)
173. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting that, since the 1700s, adherents of
numerous religions have immigrated to the United States).
175. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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thing unique to a college class.176 Keeping religion and state separate recog-
nizes the value of cultural diversity, for such separation forges an inclusive and
strong political community, avoiding divisiveness along religious lines, and pro-
tecting Christian sects and religious minorities alike. As Professor Kenneth
Karst has argued, the American political community is tied together by "the
American civic culture-a mixture of behavior and belief that infuses our law
and our institutions, transcending race, religion, and ethnicity, and allowing
individual citizens to preserve their separate cultural identities and still iden-
tify themselves as Americans.177
With respect to most Americans-those in the white, Christian major-
ity-identification with the American political community is easy and auto-
matic. The ties of religious minorities, though, are not as strong. " 8 By avoid-
ing church-state relations that would make those disfavored feel excluded, we
expand the community and strengthen community members' loyalty. 79 On the
other hand, we weaken the community through actions of exclusion, ones
which restrict the community's membership or make those disfavored feel left
out. 80 As Justice Blackmun wrote in Allegheny: "Perhaps in the early days of
the Republic [the First Amendment was] understood to protect only the diver-
sity within Christianity, but today [it is] recognized as guaranteeing religious
liberty and equality to 'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Chris-
tian faith such as Islam or Judaism.' '"
3. The Impact of Government-Backed Holiday Displays on the Political
Community
To what extent should we worry about the impact of government-backed
holiday displays on the political community? This question is quite basic, and
the Lynch and Allegheny opinions both address it. As the various opinions in
the two cases demonstrate, however, the Court divides on the issue of how
concerned we should be about government participation in holiday religious
displays.
According to Justice Kennedy, we need not be concerned with government-
backed holiday displays like those in Allegheny because they pose no real
threat of coercing people to support a religion or of taking "the first step down
the road to an establishment of religion."' 82 Former Chief Justice Burger's
176. Id. at 311-14. The Court struck down the Cal-Davis medical school's special admissions
program, which set aside a quota of spaces for minorities. But the Court expressed approval for
less rigid programs, without fixed quotas, where race and ethnicity are considered pluses in the
admissions process. Id. at 315-19.
177. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L.
REv. 303, 363 (1986) (quoted in Conkle, supra note 118, at 1167 n.213).
178. Id. at 374 (quoted in Conkle, supra note 118, at 1178).
179. See Conkle, supra note 118, at 1167.
180. Id.; see Lupu, supra note 170, at 987; supra note 170 and accompanying text.
181. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).
182. Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Lynch decision arrived at the same result in evaluating the Pawtucket creche
display. He stated, "[T]he inclusion of the creche [was not] a purposeful or
surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle government advocacy of a
particular religious message. "183 These Justices would only be troubled by ex-
treme cases, such as if a city chose to recognize every significant Christian
holiday through religious displays and ignored the holidays of other faiths.184
On the other hand, where a city seeks to do no more than to "celebrate the
season," there is no problem.185
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Kennedy, and their supporters have inter-
preted the Establishment Clause problem here quite narrowly. In essence, they
have showed concern only for the purposes behind religious displays. Those
who place religious displays on public property may have, in many cases, no
interest other than to express their joy for the holiday. Even so, the purposes
behind a display are not the only concerns. Effects are equally important. As
Professor Laurence Tribe has stressed, "[T]he [Lynch] dissenting Justices,
and Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, asked the important question:
does the 'endorsement send[] a message to nonadherents that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community?' "18' In the view of Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Kennedy, this question is not vital when it comes to
holiday religious displays, because the benefits of government-sponsored
creches, such as bringing about a friendly community spirit, outweigh any "re-
mote" costs of an "incidental" endorsement of one faith over others. 87
The analyses of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Kennedy are majoritarian,
in that they adopt the Christian majority's perspective in deciding whether a
government-backed holiday display has improperly endorsed religion.' 88 As
Professor Tribe has commented, "One cannot avoid hearing in Lynch a faint
echo of the Court that found nothing invidious in the Jim Crow policy of 'sep-
arate but equal.' "189 Ignoring the black minority's perspective, the Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson held:
Laws permitting, and even requiring, [racial] separation in places where
they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferi-
ority of either race to the other ....
... If [the law at issue does place a badge of inferiority on blacks] ... it
is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
183. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
184. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664-65 n.3 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
185. Id. at 663.
186. Tribe, supra note 158, at 610 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The same question was asked in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 626
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683, 685; Tribe, supra note 158, at 610-11.
188. Note, supra note 114, at 1659.
189. Tribe, supra note 158, at 611. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
1991]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
race chooses to put that construction upon it."90
The Warren Court, as discussed above, viewed the issue from the black per-
spective and recognized the reality of Jim Crow laws: separate is not equal,
and such laws generate in blacks feelings of inferiority and of being outsiders
in their communities.' A similar problem can be found with government-
backed holiday displays. In comparison to the majoritarian view that creche
displays do no more than celebrate the season, the view from a non-Christian
perspective is quite different. In Lynch, for example, substantial evidence was
produced that showed religious minorities saw the Pawtucket creche as an un-
ambiguous promotion of and preference for Christianity. 9 A child psychia-
trist testified that a non-Christian child, after viewing the creche display,
would wonder if he and his parents were normal.1 93 Justice Brennan noted in
his dissenting opinion that the court battle over the Pawtucket creche "un-
leashed powerful emotional reactions which divided the city along religious
lines."' 94
The hard facts of cases like Lynch indicate that the costs of such religious
displays are not "remote" but visibly concrete. Quite compelling are the
ramifications of the "left-out" feelings that religious minorities derive from
these government-backed holiday displays. When a city displays a creche, and
the Court hands down a decision like Lynch, a message of exclusion is sent to
religious minorities that tugs at their ties to the American political commu-
nity." 9 As Justice O'Connor has succinctly put it, "Endorsement [of Christi-
190. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 551 (1896).
191. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
192. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
193. Note, supra note 114, at 1657 n.85 (citing Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1159
(D.R.I. 1981), affd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
194. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
argued that a litigant cannot file a suit and use it to create the appearance of divisiveness; how-
ever, Justice Brennan effectively countered that argument by pointing out that no opposition may
have been voiced against the creche before the suit because religious minorities saw protesting the
Christian majority's creche display as futile. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Another example of a religious symbol causing divisiveness along religious lines can be found in
Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1988) (large cross on Marine
Corps base, to show national resolve to account for all MIAs, caused religious-based political
division and was thus unconstitutional).
As for Allegheny, the parties did not argue the issue of political divisiveness as was done in
Lynch, and the appeals did not address the issue. The Court left the issue open. See Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 621.
195. The message of Allegheny is ambiguous. On the one hand, it may appear to embrace
religious minorities by striking down the Pittsburgh creche display and by upholding the display of
the menorah, a minority religious symbol. On the other hand, the lack of a strong majority deci-
sion in Allegheny, combined with the firm "accommodationist" position of the Kennedy four, hints
that the creche portion of the Allegheny decision may be reversed now that Justices Brennan and
Marshall have retired, and if Justices Souter and Thomas agree with the Kennedy four. Also, the
menorah/tree display does not embrace non-Christian, non-Jewish individuals whose faiths may
be hostile to the displayed religions. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 643-44 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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anity] sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community, and an accomrpanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of/the political community.' 96 Such
government actions make it difficult for religious minorities to preserve their
religious identities and still identify themselves as Americans.
Thus, in determining how much we should worry about the effect of govern-
ment-backed holiday displays on the American political community, the views
of religious minorities must be considered. As the evidence in cases such as
Lynch shows, government-backed holiday displays pose a serious threat to the
American political community along religious lines-precisely the sort of divi-
siveness at which the Establishment Clause is aimed.
4. The Distinction Between Religious Symbols and Secular Symbols
Religious symbols, not secular symbols, raise Establishment Clause con-
cerns. To determine what holiday symbols cause concern under the Establish-
ment Clause, we need a definition of religion. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has provided no such definition. 97 In litigation over government-backed
holiday displays, a distinction frequently is made between "secular" and "reli-
gious" symbols. Secular symbols include Santa Clauses, reindeer, candy canes,
wreaths, and the like. These objects are associated with the gift-giving and
community spirit aspects of Christmas and are thought to have relatively little
"religious" significance. Things such as creches and Latin crosses are consid-
ered religious symbols, for they convey a clear religious message.'98
The distinctions made in these cases are unsatisfactory, because alleged sec-
ular symbols may convey strong religious messages. Justice Brennan hit on
this point in Allegheny when he addressed the Chanukah menorah/Christmas
tree display. Does the tree remove the religious connotations of the menorah,
or does the menorah open up the religious significance of the tree?1 99 Even
Chief Justice Burger conceded in Lynch that "the traditional, purely secular
displays existent at Christmas, with or without the creche, would inevitably
recall the religious nature of the Holiday." '
So how do we distinguish religious from secular symbols? Several authors
have hit on the concept of "civil" religion.20' The focus of this civil religion is
196. Id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch. 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
197. See Dolgin, supra note 117, at 496;,Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clar-
ification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 263 (1989). Dolgin points out that reli-
gion is an illusive concept, and by no means do I maintain that my conceptualization is all-encom-
passing. Rather, the distinctions drawn here are those that are most useful for analysis of holiday
displays.
198. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 685; ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 267-72 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986).
199. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
201. See. e.g., Dolgin, supra note 117, at 502; Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Reli-
gious Faith And Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1047 (1990);
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political, not sacral. In contrast to traditional religion, American civil religion
draws upon a distinctively American heritage. At the same time, American
civil religion has many elements similar to traditional religion. Our civil reli-
gion has its myths of origin (for example, the American Revolution), martyrs
(Lincoln, the Unknown Soldier), sacred places (Lincoln Memorial, Statue of
Liberty, Arlington Cemetery), sacred texts (Declaration of Independence,
Constitution, Bill of Rights), ritual calendar of consecration and remembrance
(Fourth of July, Memorial Day, Presidents Day), and an all-embracing world
view (the American Way of Life). 202
Individually, these things might be considered political artifacts, but to-
gether they comprise something more: a civil religion, an integrated network
of rituals, meanings, and symbols through which American society expresses
the deepest truths of its political life.20 3 These political truths include an un-
bending faith in democracy, a civic piety (that it is good to be a responsible
citizen and, for example, vote), and a belief that destiny has great things in
store for the United States.2 04
The concept of civil religion provides the foundation for evaluating holiday
displays and distinguishing what is part of the American civic culture from
what is religious in a sacral sense. Symbols qualifying as "secular" or religious
in a civic sense are those that draw upon the nation's heritage and provide a
sense of identity with the political community for all members.20 5
In this light, none of the holiday symbols qualify as secular symbols.
Whether it is a Christian creche or a Jewish menorah, a Santa Claus, Christ-
mas tree, or reindeer, the symbol draws its significance from the practices of a
sacral religion and not America's civic heritage. Contrasting with these sym-
bols are such things as a display of the Declaration of Independence or the
Statue of Liberty, symbols that derive their value from America's civic his-
tory. Given our desire for an inclusive and strong political community-at the
heart of our concern for keeping church and state separate-governmental en-
tities should not participate in holiday religious displays. Such government-
backed displays convey the message that alliance with a particular religion
(almost always Christianity) is an important element of celebrating the Amer-
ican identity.20 ' By avoiding ties to such a message, governments will avoid
Yehuda Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1248 (1986);
see also Karst, supra note 177, at 361 (discussing the concept of the "American civic commu-
nity"); Levinson, supra note 166, at 118 (discussing the "American creed").
202. Mirsky, supra note 201, at 1251; see also Dolgin, supra note 117, at 502-03 (stating that
each country develops myths about the nation's meaning, history, and people, along with corre-
sponding rituals).
203. Mirsky, supra note 201, at 1251-52.
204. Id. at 1252.
205. Id. at 1252-57. Mirsky applies the concept of civil religion to Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983), discussed supra note 126. In place of state-paid chaplains offering "nondenomi-
national" religious prayers, legislatures could open sessions with a nonreligious speaker drawing
from, say, the Declaration of Independence for inspiration. Mirsky, supra note 201, at 1255-57.
206. Dolgin, supra note 117, at 504; Mirsky, supra note 201, at 1251-52.
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sending the message to nonadherents that they are not full members of the
political community, and the corresponding message to adherents that they are
favored members of the political community.
5. Freedom of Speech and Expression in Public Forums207
A framework for adjudicating holiday display cases would not be complete
without consideration of the First Amendment's free speech mandate. The
Speech Clause of the First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law..
• abridging the freedom of speech . ... 08 Like the Establishment Clause, the
Speech Clause "is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action." 0 9 In addition, the
Supreme Court has recognized that its protection is not limited to spoken or
written words, but also includes conduct "'sufficiently imbued with elements
of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.' 210
The Speech Clause issue raised by holiday displays centers around the con-
cept of the public forum." ' The Supreme Court has recognized that areas
such as public parks and streets often are used for speeches, demonstrations,
displays, and the like. "2 Reasonable "time, place, and manner" regulations of
public forums are permitted to further significant governmental interests,213
207. This section presents the Speech Clause considerations related to holiday displays simply
to show that this interest weighs against certain restrictions on holiday displays. This Article does
not deal in detail with each of the Speech Clause concerns: for example, the concept of the public
forum, and the various justifications for limiting speech in certain circumstances.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
209. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952).
210. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974)).
211. Two things are not implicated here. First, private holiday displays on private property are
not at issue. Certain types of expression on private property may be regulated-for example, ob-
scenity. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (stating that city may use
zoning power to limit areas where adult movies may be shown). However, it is not seriously dis-
puted that private groups can put up privately owned religious displays on private property: there
are no interests in such cases to conflict with and outweigh the First Amendment's mandates of
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 601 n.51 (1989); Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1180 (D.R.I. 1981) (deeming Paw-
tucket's publicly owned creche inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, but noting that Chris-
tians could still put up creches in homes, yards, businesses, and churches), afd, 691 F.2d 1029
(1st Cir. 1982), revid, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Second, the notion of the government as a speaker is
not in issue here. Government communications on religious matters are directly restricted by the
Establishment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
212. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); see also McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716,
718 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a private creche display in Scarsdale's Boniface Circle succeeded
on all three Lemon test prongs), affd sub noma. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83
(1985).
213. For example, using streets for traffic requires limiting street use for speech activities. Us-
ing parks for rest, relaxation, and recreation also may require restrictions on competing speech
uses. See, e.g., EDWARD L. BARRETT & WILLIAM COHEN. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1178 (7th ed.
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but regulations aimed at the content of the expression are subject to strict
scrutiny by courts because content-based regulations amount to censorship, in
conflict with "free speech and expression.1"214
The problem raised by holiday displays in public forums can be put as fol-
lows: Suppose a city allows a park to be used for speeches, demonstrations,
displays, and the like. If a private group wants to put up a religious display
but is denied permission, does this constitute a content-based restriction on
free speech and expression in public forums? On the other hand, if the display
is permitted, does it give the impression that the city is endorsing the particu-
lar religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause?
215
This problem is quite compelling and has been raised in holiday display
litigation. 21 6 It is an especially thorny issue when the public forum happens to
be adjacent to an important government building. 21 7 The public forum/free-
dom of expression question must be taken into account in creating guidelines
for government-involved holiday displays.
6. A Note on Minority Religious Symbols
Since this country is predominantly Christian, displays of minority religious
groups may not appear to cause significant First Amendment issues. For ex-
ample, the government of a largely Christian city like Pittsburgh might not
appear to be endorsing Judaism by permitting a Chanukah menorah to be
displayed in front of a government building.
Even so, there are problems raised by such minority religious displays. Jus-
tice Blackmun noted in Allegheny that if the Chabad, a Jewish group, was
using the menorah in front of the Pittsburgh City-County Building as part of
1985).
214. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406-07; Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972);
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d at 730. The "strict scrutiny" test holds that if a government action
burdens a constitutional right of a person, the government must advance a compelling interest for
the action, and there must be no "less restrictive alternatives" that could achieve the same govern-
ment interest with a lesser burden on the constitutionally protected activity. Attorney General v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904, 909-10 (1986); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-51 (1982).
215. See BARRETT & COHEN, supra note 213, at 1412. Barrett and Cohen pose a similar ques-
tion in the context of speakers' access to university facilities. The Supreme Court dealt with the
university facility issue in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (sustaining freedom of speech
challenge to a state university's policy of denying use of its facilities for religious worship and
discussion).
216. See, e.g., McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d at 725.
217. See, e.g., Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 700 F. Supp. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(permitting religious displays on Daley Plaza, a public forum abutting Daley Center, Chicago's
court house); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-23 (D. Vt. 1988) (permitting
menorah display in city hall park), rev'd, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied. 110 S. Ct.
2619 (1990).
Justice Blackmun noted the public forum dilemma in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 600 n.50 (1989). It was not at issue in Allegheny because the Grand Staircase of the county
courthouse was not "the kind of location in which all were free to place their displays for weeks at
a time." Id.
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its proselytizing mission, the menorah display could be challenged. 21 "8 Such a
use of the display, directly in front of a government building, could give the
appearance of government approval of the Chabad's activity and entail the
same type of negative impact on the political community that government-
supported Christian symbols have, especially on people who are neither Jewish
nor Christian. Problems can also exist in towns where a minority religious
group comprises a substantial percentage of the population. For example, in a
town where the majority is Jewish, a menorah display in front of the town hall
clearly would appear to endorse Judaism.
In addition, it would seem odd to permit minority religious symbols in pub-
lic places where we would not permit Christian symbols. The Allegheny creche
was struck down because, standing alone in front of a government building, it
had the effect of demonstrating government endorsement of Christianity. A
menorah placed in front of a government building that is used by a Jewish
group to proselytize (albeit next to a Christmas tree) would appear to have the
same effect, at least from the perspective of a non-Jewish and non-Christian
individual. 21 9 Whether the religious symbol is that of the majority or a minor-
ity religion, government involvement tugs at some groups' ties to the political
community.220 Given our desire for a political community free of divisiveness
along religious lines, the best solution is to treat all religious symbols on the
same level,221 a solution discussed further below.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR HANDLING GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN
HOLIDAY DISPLAYS
A. General Considerations
Before laying out a framework for dealing with government-involved holiday
displays, a summary of the key "inputs" to these guidelines is in order. On the
doctrinal level, the above analysis demonstrates that the Lemon and "no en-
dorsement" tests are indeterminate and can be manipulated to fit the particu-
lar ideological view of each judge. On the historical level, government-backed
holiday displays are a modern phenomenon, and any accommodations of
Christianity that existed in the past occurred against a backdrop of discrimi-
nation against religious minorities. Today, the United States is more culturally
218. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 n.70 (nonmajority portion of opinion of Blackmun, J.). The
proselytizing issue was not before the Court, but Blackmun noted that the lower courts could
address it on remand. Id.
219. Also, as noted by the Second Circuit in Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 10 S. Ct. 2619 (1990), if a minority religious symbol such as a menorah
is permissible, "it would also seem permissible to display, standing alone, a symbol of the majority
faith-a creche or a cross-and this could well lead members of minority religions or nonbelievers
to think that ' "adherence to a religion" ' was relevant to ' "standing in the political community."'
Id. at 1030 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
220. Id. at 1031.
221. Id.
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diverse than ever before, and we desire a strong and inclusive political commu-
nity that gives weight to the opinions of minorities, as well as those in the
majority. Religious displays are not unifying themes for all Americans, and
nonadherents are made to feel like outsiders when the government appears to
express approval for a particular religion through close ties with that religion's
holiday displays.
Given these factors, the best policy is for governments to treat religions
evenhandedly. 222 This policy can also be viewed as emanating directly from
the wording of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment: "No
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. '223 To attain this policy of evenhandedness, governments should
look to remove themselves as far as possible from ties to religious practices.
Prohibiting governments from adopting or expressing approval for certain reli-
gions means that all religions are treated equally, and no perceptions of official
discrimination will exist. Elimination of state religious endorsements permits
each religion to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and appeal of
its dogma. 12 24 Evenhandedness thus strengthens the political community, for it
maximizes the religious liberty in this country, making no one feel like an
outsider.
B. The Strengthened Lemon Test
Although the existing Lemon test has proven to be an unsatisfactory tool for
Establishment Clause analysis, that test can be reworked, based on the above
"inputs," into an effective framework for examining government-backed holi-
day displays. To achieve a policy of neutrality by minimizing the extent to
which governments involve themselves with holiday religious displays, I pro-
pose a strengthening of the Lemon test along the lines of strict scrutiny.225 The
222. See Laycock, supra note 147, at 922 (calling for neutrality toward religion and among
religions); Porth & George, supra note 166, at 164-69 (stating that if the authors were to redraft
the Constitution they would impose a constitutional duty on governments to treat religions even-
handedly); Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1258, 1276 (1989) (noting that neutrality does not require the government to ignore
religious groups but to treat each religion with equal respect).
223. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause in
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), a case where a Minnesota statute granted a preference to
certain religions but not others. As for federal actions, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
has been interpreted to include a mandate of equal protection. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
224. Note, supra note 114, at 1674 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)); see
also Laycock, supra note 147, at 922 (noting that government conduct that neither encourages
nor discourages religion "maximizes religious liberty in a pluralistic society"); Lupu, supra note
170, at 987-89 (stating that government should avoid any actions that place "atmospheric bur-
dens" on minorities' free exercise of religion).
225. For a definition of the Lemon test and strict scrutiny test, see supra notes 20-27 and
accompanying text and supra note 214 and accompanying text, respectively. The Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, (1982), discussed supra note 223.
The First Circuit applied strict scrutiny to strike down the creche in Lynch, Donnelly v. Lynch,
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test will be laid out and then applied to specific cases.
First, the government action with regard to a holiday religious display must
have more than just any secular purpose. The government action must have a
"substantial" secular purpose, and that purpose must be unrelated to showing
any form of favoritism to a particular religion.2 6 Such a strengthening of the
secular purpose test recognizes that government involvement with religious dis-
plays can demonstrate favoritism for the involved religion and have a negative
impact on the political community, making nonadherents (usually religious
minorities) feel like outsiders. This important concern might be outweighed
only by very important conflicting interests: for example, freedom of expres-
sion in public forums.
Second, the government involvement with the holiday display must not have
the effect of "endorsing" the involved religion, as seen from the perspective of
the "reasonable nonadherent."227 This improves on the "primary effect" test of
Lemon because the focus here is placed directly on the perspective of
nonadherents. This focus effectively blocks the unacceptable use of historical
"accommodations," which came hand-in-hand with blatant discrimination, as
a basis for holiday display analysis. In cases involving creches and other Chris-
tian symbols, this effect test ensures that the views of religious minorities are
not ignored or de-emphasized in the way that they were in Chief Justice Bur-
ger's Lynch opinion and Justice Kennedy's Allegheny opinion. 2 8
Third, the government ties to the holiday display will not be condoned if
there are effective alternatives that lessen government involvement with reli-
gion. This prong is stronger. than the "excessive entanglement" test of Lemon
because it leaves no room for maneuvering over the term "excessive," as oc-
691 F.2d 1034-35 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), but Chief Justice Burger refused to
do so in the Supreme Court's disposition of the case, summarily dismissing strict scrutiny in a
footnote at the end of his opinion. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 n.13 (1984). The Chief
Justice did not find Pawtucket's creche sufficiently discriminatory to employ strict scrutiny, but as
shown earlier in this Article, he was insensitive to the protests of religious minorities on this point.
See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
The test put forth in this Article could be framed simply as a strict scrutiny test. I choose to use
the Lemon test as my basis for two reasons. First, Lemon has been the Establishment Clause tool
for nearly two decades. Strengthening the Lemon test seems to be less of a departure from existing
Establishment Clause doctrine than a full jump to strict scrutiny, which the Court refused to
employ in Lynch. Second, despite its problems, the Lemon test more clearly isolates the key Estab-
lishment Clause inquiries (purpose, effect, and degree of government involvement) than does strict
scrutiny.
226. Other adjectives besides "substantial" that the Court has employed include "compelling,"
"paramount," and "strong." See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). Simson
proposes a similar improvement of the Lemon test. Simson, supra note 94, at 922-23.
227. Tribe has proposed use of the "reasonable nonadherent test." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1296 (2d ed. 1988), cited in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 620 (1989). Other words that can be used besides "endorsing" include "advancing" and
"promoting." See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593.
228. See supra notes 182-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Allegheny and Lynch
opinions).
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curred in Lynch. 2 Searching for government alternatives to involvement in
holiday display cases ensures that government links to religion are minimized,
thereby eliminating, as far as possible, perceptions of official religious discrimi-
nation and permitting each religion to "flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and appeal of its dogma. 1280 In some cases, the concept of "civil
religion" may be useful in the search for alternatives-for example, where the
government purpose appears legitimate but could be accomplished by means
not involving religious symbols.
C. Application of the Strengthened Lemon Test
With the new holiday display test laid out, an application of the test to
various cases can take place. Lynch and Allegheny are relatively easy to ana-
lyze under the new test. However, as will be shown, there are harder cases
even with a stronger Establishment Clause test.
1. Lynch v. Donnelly (the Creche)231
The answer in Lynch is simple. Pawtucket's display fails on all three prongs
of the new test. First, government ownership and display of a creche offers no
"substantial" secular purpose. While the Lynch majority could pervert the
meaning of the Lemon "secular purpose" test to find that there is a secular
purpose in depicting the historical origins of Christmas, 2 2 such a purpose is
not even arguably "substantial." Second, the evidence in Lynch clearly estab-
lished that nonadherents viewed the government-owned creche as an endorse-
ment of Christianity. 2"2 This evidence would satisfy the effect test as seen from
the perspective of the "reasonable nonadherent."
Third, there is an obvious, less government-involved alternative to the City
of Pawtucket's display. In place of a government-owned display in a private
park, private groups could erect their own creche in the same place, thus re-
moving government ties from the display. This would provide Pawtucket's
Christian citizens with all the religious satisfaction that they derive from the
government-owned creche, except for explicit government endorsement of
Christianity, which alienates religious minorities from the political community.
2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU
The analysis of Allegheny is not quite as easy as that of Lynch, but the end
229. See supra notes 20-29, 41-45 and accompanying text.
230. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); see also ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794
F.2d 265, 276 (7th Cir.) (holding that placing cross on private building gives Christians in St.
Charles "all the lawful satisfaction they [can] derive from the cross on the firehouse"), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986).
231. 1 take up the "secular" Christmas symbols (reindeer, Santa Clauses, etc.) at the end of
this section, as they are a more difficult issue.
232. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Lynch majority opinion).
233. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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result is the same. Both the creche display and the Chanukah menorah/
Christmas tree display fail the strengthened Lemon test. First, there are no
substantial purposes for putting these displays directly in front of government
buildings, or in the case of the menorah display, for Pittsburgh to store and
erect it. The Grand Staircase of the County Courthouse, where the creche was
placed, is not "the kind of location in which all were free to place their dis-
plays for weeks at a time."' ' Since the Grand Staircase is not a public forum,.
no free speech interest is implicated as would be if the Grand Staircase were a
public forum. 35 The same appears to hold true for the menorah/tree display
located in front of the Pittsburgh City-County Building, though the Court did
not address the public forum issue on the menorah/tree display. 36
Justice O'Connor argued that there was a legitimate purpose in the meno-
rah display's "theme of liberty and pluralism. '237 Such a theme is certainly
founded upon important American political values;2 38 however, utilizing the
third prong of the Lemon test, Allegheny County could achieve this purpose
through less religious means. The county could draw upon our "civil religion"
to convey the liberty theme (through, for example, a mural depicting a scene
from the American Revolution, and the creation of the Constitution) and use
nonsacral means to demonstrate the pluralism theme (through, for example, a
painting showing friendship among people of different backgrounds). Such a
display would avoid the problems inherent in the menorah/tree display of
making those neither Christian nor Jewish feel like outsiders in the political
community.
With respect to the second prong of the new Lemon test (whether a reasona-
ble nonadherent would view the two Allegheny displays as official endorse-
ments of the involved religions), five members of the Court found that the
creche, standing directly in front of the county courthouse, endorsed Christi-
anity under the less stringent "primary effect" test of Lemon.239 The focus was
on what the "reasonable observer" saw in the display. 2 0 If the analysis con-
centrates on the "reasonable nonadherent," then the outcome on the creche
clearly remains the same: Non-Christians would see in the creche a message of
official endorsement of Christianity." 1
234. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 n.50 (1989).
235. Id. (citing McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affid sub nom. Board of
Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985)).
236. Id. at 588 n.38.
237. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
239. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-614.
240. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
241. This conclusion flows from the findings in Lynch. See supra notes 39-40, 105 and accom-
panying text. The Allegheny Court addressed the endorsement issue as each Justice personally
saw it. There was no evidence on what religious minorities saw in the displays as there was in
Lynch. The Court invited further examination of this issue on remand. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
621 (permitting the lower courts to look at the "purpose" and "entanglement" prongs of the
Lemon test).
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The menorah/tree display should fail the second prong as well. First, the
city stored, erected, and removed the display every year. That type of govern-
ment involvement alone could lead a person neither Christian nor Jewish to
believe that the government endorses those two religions. Second, from the
standpoint of the reasonable observer, a look at the display may or may not
have conveyed a message of endorsement. As Justice Brennan noted, "Both
are reasonable interpretations .... "' The same should hold true when the
menorah display was viewed from the perspective of the reasonable nonadher-
ent, especially since the entrance to the City-County Building was not a public
forum, and a nonadherent reasonably could think that the government only
allowed select displays there. However, many of the Justices would feel
otherwise.243
Even if some justices would allow the Allegheny displays to pass muster on
the first two prongs of the new Lemon test, the third prong would clearly settle
the issue. As noted above, the theme of liberty and pluralism that Justice
O'Connor saw in the menorah/tree display could be achieved by the County of
Allegheny through nonreligious means. In addition, instead of placing the Al-
legheny displays in front of government buildings, the private groups could
place their displays on prominent private property in Pittsburgh. The displays
would receive significant visibility in such private locations, and at the same
time would avoid the appearance of official endorsement, which occurs when
the displays are placed directly in front of government buildings. Thus, both
Allegheny displays should be moved away from government buildings.
The third prong of the stronger Lemon test answers the question of the le-
gitimacy of the Allegheny displays, but it also raises an important question:
Are private displays in public parks satisfactory alternatives?
3. Private Displays in Public Forums
The issue of private religious displays in public forums has no clear answer.
No matter what test is employed, two important interests come into conflict:
(1) avoiding government favoritism for certain religions; and (2) free speech in
public forums. Such a problem does not exist in Lynch- and Allegheny-type
cases because there is no strong interest running up against Establishment
Clause concerns.2" As discussed earlier, if a private group is denied permis-
242. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Brennan would have struck down
the menorah display in Allegheny because religious endorsement was a reasonable interpretation
of the display).
243. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616-17 (non-majority portion of opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(concluding that a reasonable nonadherent would not see the menorah/tree display as a double
endorsement of Judaism and Christianity).
244. A proponent of Justice Kennedy's analysis may argue that "accommodation" weighs in
here, but as shown in Part II, supra notes 136-62 and accompanying text, Justice Kennedy's
viewpoint is based on a faulty interpretation of history and on a lack of concern for those who do
not adhere (usually non-Christians) to the religion (usually Christianity) involved in a particular
religious display (usually creches).
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sion to place a religious display in a public forum, government endorsement of
religion may be averted, but the denial may constitute a content-based restric-
tion on free speech. If the group is allowed to place the display in the public
forum, the free speech interest is protected, but the display could give the
impression that the city is endorsing the involved religion, in violation of the
Establishment Clause.'4
Courts that have dealt with the issue of private displays in public forums
have shown more concern for the speech interest. In McCreary v. Stone,246 for
example, the Second Circuit applied the Lemon test and found that a private
creche display in Scarsdale's Boniface Circle, a prominent public park, suc-
ceeded on all three Lemon prongs: (1) a secular purpose was found in permit-
ting free speech in a public forum; (2) no primary effect of advancing the
involved religion was found because any religious group could get a permit.to
place its symbols in the public forum, and a disclaimer sign was attached to
the display indicating that it was erected by a private organization; and (3)
government entanglement with religion was minimal because the display cost
the village no money, and as noted, the disclaimer sign showed that the village
was not participating in the display." ' Even when the public forum is adjacent
to a government building-raising the same concern about a perceivable mes-
sage of government endorsement that existed in Allegheny-courts have up-
held the speech interest in the religious display. 4 '
The strengthened Lemon test will not provide one general mandate in cases
involving private displays in public forums. Such a mandate is probably impos-
sible when two strong competing interests run up against each other. Rather,
the new Lemon test provides cities (which have to decide whether to grant
permits for publio forum displays) and courts (which often are asked to review
city decisions) with the key inquiries to balance effectively the competing
speech and Establishment Clause concerns in the context of the specific cir-
cumstances of the particular display and the particular public forum.
Is there a substantial secular purpose in permitting such displays? The an-
swer is yes. Such displays are a form of speech, a core First Amendment
interest. 49
Does the display give the reasonable nonadherent the impression that the
city is endorsing the displayed religion? The answer in a McCreary-type case
is not clear. The display is in a public park not next to government buildings;
any religious group could place its symbols in Boniface Circle; and a dis-
245. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text (explaining the inherent conflict between
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee and the Establishment Clause's prohibition of state-
endorsed religion).
246. 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affd sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83
(1985).
247. Id. at 725-30.
248. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text; see also McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d at
730 (recognizing that areas such as public parks and streets are often used for speeches, demon-
strations, displays, and similar other uses).
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claimer sign designed for "maximum exposure and readability" was attached
to the creche display, stating that the display belonged to a private group. 5
Given these factors, which tend to show no village endorsement of religion, a
governmental entity could conclude that it would be unreasonable for a non-
Christian to find government endorsement of Christianity in the Boniface Cir-
cle display-the village seems to be completely removed from the display. 251
Even so, there are factors cutting the other way. Boniface Circle is a promi-
nent public park, and that prominence could lead a non-Christian to see ties
between the village and the creche. The evidence in McCreary also indicated
that there was division in Scarsdale over whether the creche should be permit-
ted in Boniface Circle.2 52 If the creche display is examined in the way that
Justice Brennan viewed the Allegheny menorah/tree display, the resulting
conclusion is that a reasonable non-Christian may or may not see government
endorsement in the Boniface Circle display. Both views are reasonable. 253
These considerations lean toward finding that the creche display in Boniface
Circle fails the second prong of the new Lemon test.2 5' However, it is by no
means clear-cut because if anyone could place a religious symbol in the public
forum and a disclaimer sign was attached, it would seem that no reasonable
perception of endorsement would remain.
Whatever the result on a McCreary-type display, religious displays in public
forums adjacent to government buildings should be less acceptable under the
second prong of the new Lemon test because the location, next to a govern-
ment building, more likely presents a nonadherent with a message of govern-
ment endorsement of the displayed religion than exists in public forums re-
moved from governmental edifices .25  But this case is not clearcut either. For
example, consider Daley Plaza in Chicago.2 "6 Although Daley Plaza is adja-
cent to Daley Center, home to the Circuit Court of Cook County, Daley Plaza
is clearly a public forum. It has been used hundreds of times for speech-re-
lated activity. 257 If minority religious symbols as well as creches are permitted
to be displayed on Daley Plaza, is there really any worry about nonadherents'
perceptions of government endorsement for the various displays?
The second prong of the stronger Lemon test provides no clear answer to
private holiday displays in public forums, but the specific factors identified in
250. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 728-29.
251. This is essentially what the Second Circuit found in McCreary. Id. at 726-28.
252. Id. at 718-21.
253. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
254. The Scarsdale Board of Trustees focused on these factors when it denied permission to
display the creche in 1981 and 1982. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 721. The church group that wanted
to display the creche in Boniface Circle sued and won in McCreary. Id.
255. The Second Circuit recognized this critical distinction-between religious displays in pub-
lic forums adjacent to and not adjacent to government buildings-in Kaplan v. City of Burlington,
891 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
256. See Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 700 F. Supp. 1497 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noted
supra note 217).
257. Id. at 1500.
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the analysis of what a reasonable nonadherent sees provide a valuable basis for
judging the use of particular public forums for religious displays. Many of
these factors come up in the third prong of the new Lemon test, the prong that
examines whether there are alternatives that involve the government less. Gov-
ernments may employ reasonable "time, place, and manner" restrictions in
regulating public forums to achieve important government interests that may
compete with the speech interest in public forums.2 58 In balancing the speech
and Establishment Clause interests at issue in private holiday displays placed
in public forums, cities can place reasonable limits on the length of time that a
creche is displayed in a public park. In McCreary, the Second Circuit found
that it was fair to limit the Boniface Circle display to two weeks during the
Christmas season.2" ' Contrast this with the quite common displays that go up
immediately after Thanksgiving and come down after New Year's Day.
Longer displays certainly are permissible on private property, but placing a
reasonable time limit on a private display in a prominent public forum bal-
ances religious groups' speech interests and the Establishment Clause interest
of avoiding the impression that a city is endorsing the displayed religion.
In addition, towns may place reasonable "manner" restrictions on holiday
displays. For example, a local government can demand that a disclaimer be
attached, indicating that the display is sponsored by a private religious group
and not the town. 60 Such a disclaimer can go a long way towards removing
any notion that the city endorses the particular display.
As for "place" restrictions, it seems fair for local- governments to balance
the competing speech and Establishment Clause interests and determine that
the displays are permissible in certain public forums but not in others. Due in
part to the division that existed in Scarsdale over the Boniface Circle creche,
the Scarsdale Board of Trustees asked the church group to place its creche in
a different park.2 6 The Second Circuit found that denying the church group
access to Boniface Circle was an impermissible content-based regulation of
speech. 62 The Second Circuit's decision seems based, in part, on the fact that
only a creche was at issue in McCreary; only one religious group was being
singled out. Suppose Scarsdale were to come up with a general regulation de-
nying access to all religious displays in Boniface Circle, but permitting them in
other public forums. In such a situation, courts should not strike down the
regulation if the record shows that the Scarsdale Board carefully considered
the factors underlying the competing speech and Establishment Clause inter-
ests. The "place" regulation would be reasonable because it does not single out
one religious group but treats religion evenhandedly in weighing the conflicting
258. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
259. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 730.
260. Id. at 728-29; see also Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Vt.
1988) (noted supra note 217), rev'd, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619
(1990).
261. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 720-21.
262. Id. at 730.
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concerns. 63 Such a place regulation also would seem reasonable when the
public forum is next to a government building, avoiding the impression that
the local government is endorsing the exhibited religion.264
4. "Secular" Symbols in Holiday Displays
Besides private displays in public forums, symbols such as Christmas trees,
reindeer, and Santa Clauses raise a difficult issue. Such symbols are generally
viewed as nonreligious, for they represent the "gift-giving" and "positive com-
munity spirit" aspects of the Christmas season-even the Lynch dissenters be-
lieved this.2 16 However, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stevens and Mar-
shall, did recognize in Allegheny that Christmas trees have religious
significance, and that it is reasonable for people to see government approval of
Christianity when such symbols are too closely associated with government, as
were the displays in Allegheny.266 Also, as discussed earlier, allegedly "secu-
lar" symbols of Christmas draw their significance from the practices of Chris-
tianity, a sacral religion, and not America's civic heritage.26
Applying the strengthened Lemon test, some may argue that there is a sub-
stantial government interest in promoting goodwill and merchants' business
during the winter holiday season. But reasonable nonadherents may find that
government-owned "secular" symbols demonstrate a government preference
for the displayed religion (usually Christianity), 26 8 and that private displays on
the steps of government buildings demonstrate government endorsement as
well.2 69 Moreover, obvious alternatives exist which would yield less government
involvement with religion. Presumably there are some symbols from America's
civic heritage that could accomplish the "goodwill" goal just as well as alleg-
edly "secular" Christmas symbols.27 Cities could erect displays including a
263. See Porth & George, supra note 166, at 167 (stating that public schools could exclude all
controversial material in the realm of religion and irreligion, or could provide a reasonably bal-
anced presentation of opposing views).
264. The district court judge in the Daley Plaza case reached the opposite conclusion, stating
that Chicago could not block erection of all religious exhibitions during the holiday season absent
a showing of a compelling government interest. Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 700 F.
Supp. 1497, 1501 (N.D. I11. 1988). The Establishment Clause concerns inherent in such cases
comprise a compelling interest, see Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990), and they deserved more careful consideration than
given in Grutzmacher.
265. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 699-700 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 640 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
267. See supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
268. See Lubavitch Chabad House v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, No. 88-C-8708, 1989 WL 157661
(N.D. I11. Dec. 11, 1989) (noting Jewish group's challenge of Chicago's display of Christmas
trees, wreaths, and garlands at O'Hare International Airport), affd sub. noam. Lubavitch Chabad
House v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (1990).
269. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 641-42 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
270. Non-Christmas symbols would probably achieve the goodwill goal better, given that non-
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Statue of Liberty, Abraham Lincoln, the Washington Monument, or other na-
tional symbols. Each of these symbols could promote goodwill in a civic and
not sacral sense. Private displays of trees, Santas, and the like on private prop-
erty would accomplish the goodwill (at least for Christians) and business goals
as well, as long as government participation and the attendant perception of
government endorsement of Christianity were eliminated.
Finally, as for private "secular" displays in public forums, the private dis-
play/public forum analysis described above provides governments with the
foundation for weighing the conflicting speech and Establishment Clause in-
terests at issue in such exhibits. 27 1 Whatever the result from such an analysis,
it seems clear that the government should not be placing the symbols in the
public forum, for the private groups can easily accomplish that end
themselves.171
CONCLUSION
As mentioned earlier, no one test will solve every case that arises under the
Establishment Clause. Even when the analysis is confined to holiday displays,
the notion that there will be a clear-cut answer in every case is illusory. It is
possible, though, to formulate coherent guidelines so that the right questions
always are asked.
The framework laid out in this Article will put local governments and courts
on better footing when they encounter holiday displays. Building up from the
key inputs (doctrinal, historical, and modern) necessary in an evaluation of
government-involved holiday displays, a test has been framed that properly
weighs the concerns at issue in such displays. The basic policy underlying the
proposed strengthening of the Lemon test is government evenhandedness,
which can best be achieved by minimizing government ties to holiday displays.
Governments should not buy, erect, or maintain religious displays, and reli-
gious displays should not be placed directly in front of government buildings,
except, possibly, when a public forum is involved. By removing themselves as
far as possible from religious displays, governments will avoid creating the per-
ception that they endorse the displayed religions.
Under the strengthened Lemon test, holiday display analyses will not be
Christians feel left out when they see those displays because they do not celebrate Christmas.
Many actually may feel hostile towards such displays, thus defeating the goal of goodwill. Id. at
645.
271. See supra notes 244-64 and accompanying text.
272. In Lubavitch Chabad House v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, No. 88-C-8708, 1989 WL 157661
(N.D. 11. Dec. 11, 1989), aff'd sub. nor. Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d
341 (1990), the court held that under Lynch, Chicago could have its employees place the city's
Christmas trees and wreaths in the public forum areas of O'Hare Airport. The judge found that
such symbols, along with "secular" Christmas music, serve the airport's interest in "lightening the
burdens and anxieties of the anxious traveler during this season. . . . It makes 'people moving'
easier ... ." Id. at *11. Such displays do not "lighten the burden" for non-Christians, and as for
music, the ordinary Muzak played in airports accomplishes the same result, without a sectarian
preference.
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"hostile" to religion, as Justice Kennedy and his Allegheny supporters might
fear. "If preventing preferential treatment of dominant or politically appealing
religions is 'hostile' to religion, it is so only in refusing to place state approval
on majoritarian religious belief; it is not hostile to the value of religious plural-
ism."' 27 The strengthened Lemon test will ensure that adherents and
nonadherents to a particular religion are fairly accommodated, and that reli-
gious minorities are not made to feel like outsiders in the political community,
thus providing "the respect for religious diversity that the Constitution
"i. 74
273. Note, supra note 114, at 1674.
274. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613.
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